ITER engineers: the lost stars
It is in the news that the ITER project is facing delays once again. This provides an opportunity to share a short anecdote from the early days of my involvement in plasma physics, particularly during the initial engineering phase of ITER.
When I entered the field of plasma physics in the 2000s, ITER was just beginning its engineering phase. The project had been signed twenty years earlier, but no foundations had yet been dug at Cadarache. It was an interesting time because plasma physics, predominantly driven by nuclear fusion in Europe in terms of budget and manpower, was undergoing significant changes.
Our laboratories were experiencing an exodus of our brightest and most experienced physicists to ITER, which was hiring them for engineering roles. This was a logic of reward and status at work: ITER was prestigious, the positions were very well-paid, and it was a privilege and a reward to be part of it. Naturally, these positions were offered to the most brilliant individuals. The only problem was that a physicist, no matter how brilliant, is not an engineer. Few at the time truly understood what engineering tasks on a development project entailed. They were surprised to find that much of their work did not involve calculations behind a computer or a blackboard but rather sitting at meeting tables, making decisions between incompatible choices, monitoring suppliers, maintaining budgets, etc.
Thus, on one hand, European laboratories, responsible for research and technological development, lost the minds capable of leading research teams. On the other hand, ITER ended up with engineers who had inadequate skills and were demotivated because they were not suited for their roles.
Over time and with changes in management, things began to return to normal. Engineers from CERN, who had previously faced similar issues (the hard way, by breaking superconductors), were “borrowed” to assist. Young engineers were recruited and trained in fusion (though unfortunately not always subsequently hired by ITER), and companies with relevant expertise were increasingly integrated into the development, bringing their implementation know-how. However, this cost money, time, and possibly a bit of the project’s credibility.
These actions should have been taken beforehand, before starting the development, but it would have been difficult to explain to high-ranking scientists that they had to wait and give up their place on this project, which was their brainchild. It is perhaps the very nature of the ITER project, born from heightened ambitions, that partly explains its delay.
